CRIMINAL LAW--INVISIBLE IN THE COURTROOM TOO: MODIFYING THE LAW OF SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR WHITE PRIVILEGE by Ryan, Mara Shulman
Western New England Law Review
Volume 34 34 (2012)
Issue 1 Article 9
6-26-2012
CRIMINAL LAW--INVISIBLE IN THE
COURTROOM TOO: MODIFYING THE
LAW OF SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT TO
ACCOUNT FOR WHITE PRIVILEGE
Mara Shulman Ryan
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mara Shulman Ryan, CRIMINAL LAW--INVISIBLE IN THE COURTROOM TOO: MODIFYING THE LAW OF SELECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR WHITE PRIVILEGE, 34 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 301 (2012),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/9
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 155 S
ide A
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 155 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE108.txt unknown Seq: 1  1-MAY-12 10:39
R
R
R
R
R
R
CRIMINAL LAW—INVISIBLE IN THE COURTROOM TOO: MODIFY­
ING THE  LAW OF  SELECTIVE  ENFORCEMENT TO  ACCOUNT FOR 
WHITE PRIVILEGE1 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 3, 2008, two men viciously taunted a University of 
Massachusetts Amherst (UMass) student through his dormitory 
window.2  “Come out and fight!” they urged him.3  The men were 
not students and had come to UMass to socialize.4  At the time of 
this exchange, they were both “highly intoxicated[.]”5  When the 
student demanded that they leave him alone, the men broke his 
window.6  Then, after gaining access to his dormitory, one of the 
men turned the verbal assault physical, throwing a punch that broke 
the student’s nose.7  Believing that his life was in danger, the stu­
dent defended himself with a knife.8  When he was able, he escaped 
1. The defendant in Commonwealth v. Vassell, the principal case discussed in this 
Note, was represented by attorneys David Hoose and Luke Ryan of the law firm Sas­
son, Turnbull, Ryan, & Hoose.  Attorney Luke Ryan is the author’s husband. 
2. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Commonwealth v. 
Vassell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Motion to 
Dismiss]. 
3. Rachel Anthony-Levine, A Black Student Fights for His Life in Massachusetts, 
CAMPUS PROGRESS (Apr. 27. 2010), http://campusprogress.org/articles/a_black_student 
_fights_for_his_life_in_massachusetts. 
4. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 13; see also Commonwealth’s Preliminary 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3, Com­
monwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2009) [hereinafter 
Commonwealth’s Opposition]. 
5. Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 4; Commonwealth’s Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief Pursuant to G.L. c.211, § 3, Commonwealth v. Vassell, SJC-2009­
231 (Mass. May 1, 2009) [hereinafter Petition for Relief]; see also Motion to Dismiss, 
supra note 2, at 13, 27 (relating how one of the men “said that he had no more than ten 
beers” and the other man “admitted that he had a few beers”) (internal brackets and 
quotations omitted); Defendant’s Motion to Strike References to the Trial and Out­
come of Docket Number 0898CR290 at 15, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008­
00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Motion to Strike] (noting that the 
blood alcohol levels of the two men were .18 and .24, above the legal limit of .08). 
6. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 1; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note 3 
(reporting that when Vassell told Bowes and Bosse through his window that “he wasn’t 
going to fight . . . [they] smashed [the] window”); Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra 
note 4, at 4 (“The encounter culminated in one of the defendant’s room window panes 
. . . being broken.”). 
7. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 1; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note 3. 
8. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 1, 11; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note 
3 (reporting that Vassell’s neighbor, Barbara Rutman, had observed Vassell “pull[ ] out 
301 
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302 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
from his attackers, joining fellow students who had observed the 
fight from behind an interior dormitory door.9  Though they had 
been stabbed, the men pounded on the door and continued to taunt 
the student.10  These men, John Bowes and Jonathan Bosse, are 
white.11  The student, Jason Vassell, is black.12  From the moment 
Bowes and Bosse first addressed Vassell through his dormitory win­
dow, the language they used was brutally racist.13 
Even though Bowes and Bosse had instigated the fight, Vassell 
was the only one of the three men who was arrested and vigorously 
prosecuted, leading many in the community to decry law enforce­
ment’s response as racist.14  Indeed racism likely fueled the arrest 
and prosecution of Jason Vassell, and it was on this basis that his 
defense attorneys sought to dismiss the charges against him in a 
motion to dismiss for selective prosecution.15  However, in addition 
to racism, this Note posits that Bowes’s and Bosse’s white privilege, 
which can be understood as an “invisible [knapsack] of unearned 
assets,”16 powerfully influenced law enforcement’s response to the 
February 3rd altercation.  White privilege, though it was never ex­
plicitly named, was certainly lurking. 
a knife and [tell Bosse and Bowes] he didn’t want to use it and [that] they should leave” 
once they had gained entry to his dormitory and continued to verbally accost him. To 
Rutman, “it looked like the first punch was thrown by the taller of the white males 
[Bosse]”). 
9. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
10. Id. at 7. 
11. Id. at 3; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note 3. 
12. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 4; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note 3. 
13. See Anthony-Levine, supra note 3 (reporting that according to Vassell’s 
neighbor, Barbara Rutman, Bowes, and Bosse shouted at Vassell, “You’re a dirty nig­
ger.  Come out and fight . . .”); Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 4 
(“Bowes cursed at the defendant by uttering profanity and racial epithets or slurs.”); 
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 4-7 (documenting the barrage of racist language 
directed at Vassell). 
14. Anthony-Levine, supra note 3 (“Many concerned citizens . . . joined the or­
ganization Justice for Jason, which has had a constant presence at every court proceed­
ing related to the case.  The group believes the disparity in charges in the case is racially 
motivated.”). 
15. See infra Part III.C.1 for a discussion of Vassell’s Motion to Dismiss for selec­
tive prosecution.  The author generally uses the term, “selective enforcement,” though 
when referring specifically to Commonwealth v. Vassell, she uses the term, “selective 
prosecution,” to remain consistent with the pleadings. 
16. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE  REVEALED: HOW  INVISIBLE  PREFER­
ENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 17 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1996) (citing 
Peggy McIntosh, Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, CREATION SPIRI­
TUALITY, Jan.-Feb. 1992 at 33). 
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303 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
White privilege has been scantily mentioned in any subject 
area of the case law.17  Specifically in the context of selective en­
forcement claims, courts focus on whether people of color are ar­
rested or prosecuted for belonging to a racial minority group (a 
result of racism) rather than on whether people like Bowes and 
Bosse evade arrest or prosecution for being white (a result of white 
privilege).18  One problem with the practice of focusing on the de­
fendant’s race in selective enforcement cases is that differential 
treatment is not necessarily the result of racial animus.19  If racial 
animus, conscious or unconscious, is not the cause of a particular 
instance of selective enforcement, then the focus on the defendant’s 
race is misguided.  Another flaw with existing selective enforcement 
law is that it only deals in half-truths.  By keeping the invisible 
17. See infra Part III.B. 
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 703 (Mass. 2008) (observ­
ing that “Justices of [the Supreme Judicial Court] have expressed considerable concern 
about [the problem of driving while black]”); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (noting that “[i]t is indisputable . . . that the police may not 
stop a motorist based on race . . .”).  Since both cases deal with racial profiling, it is 
logical that the courts focus on the question of whether people of color are targeted 
because they belong to a racial minority group.  Yet the courts fail to address the in­
verse issue—whether white motorists are treated preferentially. See also Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (focusing on the harms created for the minority 
group by the unequal application of laws rather than on the benefits generated for the 
dominant group). 
19. See generally Donna Coker, Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in 
the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 860 (2003) (discussing 
how the “intentional discrimination standard is wholly inadequate to address most of 
the racial disparity in the criminal justice system”).  In some jurisdictions, a showing of 
discriminatory intent is necessary to prove selective enforcement. See, e.g., Jones v. 
Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271, 1278 (Ariz. 2005) (“Because a selective enforcement claim rests 
on an assertion that the Equal Protection Clause has been violated, the claimant must 
demonstrate that state action ‘had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.’”) (emphasis added).  This, however, is not a requirement in 
Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 233 (Mass. 1978). 
Though Massachusetts defendants must overcome a presumption that discriminatory 
intent was not a factor in their arrests or prosecutions, their burden does not include a 
mandate to demonstrate discriminatory intent. Id.  The focus of this Note is on Massa­
chusetts’ selective enforcement law and a more in-depth look at jurisdictional variances 
is beyond its scope.  However, in jurisdictions where a showing of discriminatory intent 
or racial animus is required, some selective enforcement claims may fail for the reason 
that a particular act of selective enforcement may have been caused not by racial ani­
mus, but rather by white privilege.  Unearthing unconscious racism with a legal stan­
dard that requires a showing of intentional discrimination may be nearly impossible. 
See Coker, supra at 860; infra note 25 (discussing unconscious racism).  Using the same 
legal standard to reveal white privilege, then, is entirely impracticable. For this reason, 
jurisdictions like Arizona, which require a showing of discriminatory intent, should for­
mally recognize white privilege in order to make their laws more effective in remedying 
instances of selective enforcement. See Jones, 110 P.3d at 1278. 
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304 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
knapsack (and the very real and entirely unearned benefits con­
tained therein) completely shrouded, this area of the law cannot 
achieve one of the goals it aims to address: ending racial bias in the 
enforcement of criminal laws.20 
Using Commonwealth v. Vassell as an illustration, this Note ar­
gues that the law of selective enforcement in Massachusetts should 
explicitly account for white privilege.21  Part I looks at law enforce­
ment’s response to the February 3rd altercation, exploring the in­
terplay between discretion, discrimination, and privilege.  Part II 
examines the development of the law of selective enforcement in 
Massachusetts, after taking a brief look at two seminal federal 
cases.  Part III addresses the concept of white privilege and the role 
it played in Commonwealth v. Vassell.  Finally, Part IV argues that 
the law of selective enforcement is ripe for the incorporation of 
white privilege into its formal legal doctrine.  Furthermore, a legal 
recognition of white privilege is necessary in order to curb the abil­
ity of courts hostile to selective enforcement claims from too readily 
dismissing such claims.  To this end, this Note proposes language 
modifying the Massachusetts law of selective enforcement to ac­
count for white privilege. 
I. COMMONWEALTH V. VASSELL—A CASE OF DISCRETION,
 
DISCRIMINATION, AND PRIVILEGE
 
Following the February 3rd altercation, the UMass Police De­
partment (UMPD) arrested Jason Vassell and charged him with two 
counts each of armed assault with intent to murder, and aggravated 
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.22  Four days after the 
incident, the UMPD filed a criminal complaint against John Bowes, 
asking that he be charged with disorderly conduct, a civil rights vio­
lation resulting in bodily injury, and assault and battery to intimi­
20. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (“[The provisions of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment] are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, 
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal 
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”). 
21. This Note focuses exclusively on Massachusetts’ selective enforcement law, 
with a brief look at two key federal cases. See infra Part II.A.  Of course, a change in 
Massachusetts law can have implications for other jurisdictions as well. 
22. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 22; see also Petition for Relief, supra note 
5, at 1-2. 
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305 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
date with bodily injury.23  The UMPD never filed a criminal 
complaint against Jonathan Bosse.24 
It is not unusual for police officers to perform their official du­
ties in a discriminatory manner.25  When acting with discretion in 
terms of whom they choose to apprehend, arrest, or charge, police 
officers access and act upon their “subjective beliefs, biases, 
hunches, and prejudices.”26  Accordingly, the UMPD may have 
targeted Vassell because of prejudices they held, even uncon­
sciously, about African American men.27  The inverse is also true. 
Since police officers “are not required to make an arrest when they 
observe conduct creating probable cause” that a crime has oc­
curred, “their [use of] discretion may result in the failure to detain 
or arrest whites who commit acts for which their African American 
counterparts would often be detained or arrested.”28  The February 
3rd altercation provides a stark illustration of this practice.  Despite 
witness statements that the police took of Bowes’s and Bosse’s 
criminal behavior, the officers did not arrest either of the two white 
men.29  Unlike Vassell, Bowes and Bosse benefited from the 
UMPD’s use of discretion. 
23. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 29-30.  Bowes was never arrested; rather, 
he was informed of these charges when the clerk-magistrate sent him a summons on 
February 8, 2008 in anticipation of his February 26th arraignment. Id. at 30. 
24. Id. at 20. 
25. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discre­
tion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 26-27 (1998) (“Police officers often act in a discrimina­
tory manner in the performance of their official duties when they disproportionately 
stop, detain, and arrest African American men, with or without probable cause, and 
with or without articulable suspicion.”). 
26. Id. at 27. See generally Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Gimme Some More: Centering 
Gender and Inequality in Criminal Justice and Discretion Discourse, 18 AM. U. J. GEN­
DER SOC. POL’Y & L. 607, 613 (2010) for a discussion of “the interstices of discretion,” 
places in the criminal justice system where police and prosecutors can make decisions 
without transparency and accountability. 
27. See, e.g., M.K.B. Darmer, Teaching Whren to White Kids, 15 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 109, 112 (2009) (“[D]eeply entrenched police practices [like the practice of racial 
profiling, persist because of] the myth of inherent black criminality . . . stubbornly en­
trenched in American consciousness.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Coker, 
supra note 19, at 864 (“[T]he deeply embedded belief among whites of black criminality 
‘create[s] the criminalblackman.’”) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); Geiza Var­
gas-Vargas, White Investment in Black Bondage, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 41, 51 (2005) 
(discussing the “white conception of blacks and criminals as synonymous”). 
28. Davis, supra note 25, at 27 (emphasis added). 
29. See Anthony-Levine, supra note 3 (describing how police permitted Bowes 
and Bosse to leave the police station after the incident). 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 157 S
ide B
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 157 Side B      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE108.txt unknown Seq: 6  1-MAY-12 10:39
R
R
R
R
306 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
Prosecutors, too, may conduct their official duties in a discrimi­
natory manner.30  Like police officers, they enjoy a considerable 
amount of discretion.31  On February 4, 2008, the office of the 
Northwestern District Attorney, Elizabeth D. Scheibel (DA) 
moved to have Vassell detained as a dangerous person.32  The DA 
asserted that “[n]o conditions of release imposed upon the defen­
dant [would] reasonably assure the safety of . . . John Bowes and 
Jonathan Bosse, or the community.”33  With this motion, the prose­
cutor took the position that Vassell posed a serious threat, despite 
the fact that he had no prior record of arrest.34  Unlike Vassell, 
Bowes and Bosse had a long history of engaging in criminal behav­
ior,35 and still the DA, like the UMPD, chose to treat the white men 
preferentially.  The prosecutor did not seek to detain Bowes as a 
dangerous person or impose any conditions on his release,36 and the 
DA never prosecuted Bosse for any of his criminal conduct.37 
The preferential treatment that Bowes and Bosse received, 
first from the UMPD and later from the DA, is an example of white 
privilege.  The contents of their invisible knapsacks proved ex­
tremely valuable to Bowes and Bosse after the February 3rd alter­
cation.  As a result of their whiteness, the men received the benefit 
of the doubt in circumstances where evidence indicated that they 
had committed hate crimes, damaged public property, instigated a 
fight, and broken a man’s nose.38  This exercise of white privilege so 
tainted the prosecution’s case against Vassell that he and his attor­
30. Davis, supra note 25, at 32 (“Like police officers, prosecutors often make de­
cisions that discriminate against African American victims and defendants.”). 
31. See, e.g., Renée M. Landers, Sexual Activity Between Minors, Prostitution, and 
Prosecutorial Discretion; What Difference Should Age and Sex Make?, BOSTON B. J. 11 
May/June 2009 (critiquing “[t]he notion that prosecutors should have unreviewable dis­
cretion in charging and other decisions that precede judicial involvement . . .”). 
32. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 24. 
33. Id. 
34. Id.; see Fred Contrada, Jason Vassell Probation Ends After 21/2 years; Support­
ers Rally in Northampton, MASSLIVE.COM (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.masslive.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2010/08/jason_vassell_probation_ends_a.html for an example of how the 
DA’s office portrayed Vassell.  In this article, the author notes that the original prose­
cuting attorney in Vassell’s case “called [him] a menace to society.” Id. (quoting UMass 
professor emeritus of Afro-American Studies, Ekwueme Michael Thelwell). 
35. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 18; see infra note 181. 
36. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 30. 
37. Id. at 35. 
38. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text. 
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307 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
neys sought a dismissal of the indictment on the basis of selective 
prosecution.39 
II. THE LAW OF SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
Before discussing the development of the law of selective en­
forcement in Massachusetts, this section will briefly address two 
seminal Supreme Court cases.  The first provides a foundational 
look at the concept of equal protection.40  The second explores the 
separation of powers doctrine.41 
A.	 Equal Protection and the Separation of Powers Doctrine: The 
Federal Approach 
In its 1886 Yick Wo decision, the Supreme Court famously 
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the government 
from “mak[ing] unjust and illegal discriminations between persons 
in similar circumstances.”42  There, a San Francisco ordinance pro­
hibited laundry operators from running their businesses out of 
wooden buildings without first obtaining the permission of city su­
pervisors.43  The supervisors refused to grant permission to over 200 
Chinese laundry operators, while simultaneously granting permis­
sion to eighty laundry operators who were not Chinese.44  Finding 
no apparent reason for the differential treatment afforded to Chi­
nese versus non-Chinese laundry operators, the Court concluded 
“that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and national­
ity to which the petitioners belong.”45  Accordingly, the Court or­
dered that the Chinese laundry operators, who had been jailed for 
operating their businesses without permission, be released.46  The 
spirit of this seminal equal protection case—that the law must not 
39. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2.  Before the motion was heard on its merits, 
the Commonwealth agreed to drop the criminal charges against Vassell in exchange for 
an additional two months of pretrial probation. James F. Lowe, Probation for Vassell: 
“Regret” Admitted, but not Guilt in 2008 Stabbing at UMass Dorm, GAZETTENET.COM 
(June 5, 2010), http://www.gazettenet.com/2010/06/05/probation-for-vassell. 
40. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). 
41. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996). 
42. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374. 
43. Id. at 368. 
44. Id. at 374. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
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308 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
be administered “with an evil eye and an unequal hand”47—sits at 
the core of all selective enforcement claims.48 
Another concept integral to the law of selective enforcement is 
the judiciary’s interest in preserving the separation of powers, re­
sulting in its great deference to the prosecution.  In United States v. 
Armstrong, multiple black defendants were indicted on charges of 
conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute over fifty grams of 
crack cocaine.49  The defendants filed motions both to dismiss their 
indictments on the basis of selective prosecution and also to obtain 
discovery that might substantiate their claim.50  Reasoning that it 
would be a misappropriation of power for it to interfere with the 
responsibilities of the executive’s delegates, the Court found a pre­
sumption of prosecutorial regularity and denied the defendants’ dis­
covery requests.51  The Court ruled that only clear evidence of 
improper conduct could defeat the broad exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.52  In arriving at this conclusion, the Court was concerned 
that any less stringent standard would “undermine prosecutorial ef­
fectiveness” and jeopardize the separation of powers.53  Under 
Armstrong, the separation of powers doctrine requires that the gov­
ernment be afforded significant discretion in choosing whom to 
prosecute criminally.  This is true of Massachusetts’ selective prose­
cution law, as well.54 
47. Id. at 373-74. 
48. See infra Part II.B. 
49. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996). The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine the appropriate discovery standard for defendants seek­
ing to demonstrate selective prosecution. Id. at 461; see infra note 96 for a discussion of 
the discovery standard promulgated in Armstrong. 
50. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459. 
51. Id. at 464. 
52. Id.  See Coker, supra note 19, at 827 for a discussion of the “Catch-22” cre­
ated by an evidentiary standard that requires a defendant to present clear evidence of 
prosecutorial misconduct in order to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct. 
53. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.  In addition to its interest in remaining deferential 
to the government, the Court was concerned about the application of Rule 16(a)(1)(c) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 462.  It reasoned that the expansive 
discovery permitted by the rule applies to “shield” defenses only (i.e. defenses made in 
direct response to the government’s case in chief) rather than “sword” defenses (i.e. 
challenges, such as selective prosecution, to the government’s conduct in prosecuting 
the case). Id. 
54. In a recent decision, the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts addressed 
the issue of prosecutorial discretion in the context of preserving the separation of pow­
ers.  Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Mass. 2009).  “[J]udicial re­
view of [the prosecution’s] decisions must proceed circumspectly lest we intrude on a 
function constitutionally vouchsafed to another branch of government.” Id.  The Court 
warned, however, that “prosecutorial discretion may not transgress the limits set out in 
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309 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
B.	 The Law of Selective Enforcement in Massachusetts 
This section now turns to Massachusetts where defendants face 
fewer barriers in demonstrating selective enforcement than their 
federal counterparts.55  Commencing in 1977, with its decision in 
Commonwealth v. King, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has de­
veloped a strong body of law for Massachusetts defendants seeking 
to demonstrate selective enforcement.56 
1.	 Establishing the Tripartite Burden: Two Foundational 
Cases on Race- and Sex-Based Selective 
Enforcement 
In Commonwealth v. King, three female defendants presented 
the SJC with “a broad scale attack on the Massachusetts law against 
prostitution.”57  Although the court refused to reverse the defend­
ants’ convictions for prostitution and common night walking,58 it 
did affirm one of their equal protection arguments, thereby estab­
lishing the foundation for subsequent selective enforcement claims 
in Massachusetts.59 
The defendants alleged that their convictions were the result of 
an unconstitutional and discriminatory application of the law.60 
Specifically, they argued that “law enforcement policies and prac­
tices [existed] whereby female prostitutes were prosecuted under 
[anti-prostitution laws] while male prostitutes and male customers 
our Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions; in the final analysis, it is the judicial 
branch’s solemn duty to ensure that such overreaching does not occur.” Id. 
55. See Coker, supra note 19, at 829 (“The Supreme Court’s discovery rule in 
United States v. Armstrong . . . made it practically impossible for defendants to prevail 
on selective prosecution claims.”).  See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of how the Armstrong discovery rule compares to the equivalent rule in 
Massachusetts. 
56.	 Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1977). 
57.	 Id. at 198. 
58. Id. at 199.  The court observed that some statistical evidence, which the de­
fendants provided in their appellate briefs, seemed to support one of their equal protec­
tion claims, but since the evidence had not been presented to the trial court, it could not 
be considered during appellate review. Id. at 204-05.  Unable to consider this evidence, 
the court held that the record was too “conjectural” to come to any conclusions about 
the veracity of the defendants’ claim. Id.  This corollary issue in King—statistical evi­
dence used for the purpose of demonstrating selective enforcement—foreshadows a 
central issue in a case adjudicated by the SJC twenty-one years later.  Commonwealth v. 
Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688 (Mass. 2008); see infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
59.	 King, 372 N.E.2d at 207. 
60. Id. at 203.  The defendants raised a host of other constitutional challenges as 
well, including due process and the right of privacy. Id. at 201-03.  None of these per­
tain to the issue of selective enforcement. 
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310 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
of prostitutes were not.”61  The court disposed of the second issue, 
reasoning that it was the legislature’s prerogative to criminalize the 
prostitute’s conduct and not the customer’s.62 
However, the SJC did not so readily dismiss the first issue: 
whether law enforcement discriminated between female and male 
prostitutes.63  There, the court held that female defendants charged 
with prostitution could win a motion to dismiss on a “showing that 
the police department or the prosecutor’s office followed an unjus­
tifiable policy of selective enforcement against female prostitutes 
and not male prostitutes.”64  A defendant could meet her initial 
burden65 of showing selective enforcement by “presenting . . . evi­
dence which strongly suggests or raises a reasonable inference that 
there existed in connection with her arrest or prosecution a sex-
based distinction in law enforcement practice in the consistent and 
unjustifiable failure to prosecute male prostitutes.”66  If the defen­
dant successfully raised a “reasonable inference” of sex-based selec­
tive enforcement, the Commonwealth would have to “rebut that 
61. Id. at 204. 
62. Id.  Nevertheless Chief Justice Hennessey, in his concurrence, urged the 
Court to 
[recognize] the validity of the defendants’ argument that unlawful discrimina­
tion in enforcement can be proved by a showing that  the police department or 
prosecutor’s office followed an unjustifiable policy of prosecuting prostitutes 
and not their customers.  This policy in turn may be shown to be sex-based 
discrimination (and thus subject to strict scrutiny) by a showing that most 
prostitutes are women and most customers are male. 
Id. at 207 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted). The Chief Justice went on 
to explain that “even though the Legislature has made no express provision for the 
prosecution of the customers of prostitutes, the existence of correlative statutory crimes 
[e.g. lewd, wanton and lascivious speech or behavior] . . . may give support to a charge 
of unconstitutional discrimination . . . .” Id. at 208 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring). 
This proposition gained traction in Commonwealth v. Lafaso where a Massachu­
setts Appeals Court held that the defendant, a woman charged with common night 
walking, had raised a reasonable inference of selective prosecution by presenting evi­
dence that the “police not only did not arrest the men who picked up the defendant, 
they made no effort to investigate or obtain additional evidence to support the prosecu­
tion of the defendant’s clients or johns in general.”  Commonwealth v. Lafaso, 727 
N.E.2d 850, 854 (Mass. 2000). 
63. King, 372 N.E.2d at 204-05. 
64. Id. at 205 (emphasis added). 
65. Id. at 207.  The defendant bears the initial burden, because courts “presume 
that criminal arrests and prosecutions are undertaken in good faith, without [the] intent 
to discriminate.” Id.  As previously discussed, courts afford the prosecution broad def­
erence at the outset in an effort to preserve the separation of powers. See supra Part 
II.A. 
66. King, 372 N.E.2d at 207. 
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311 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
inference or suffer [a dismissal of] the underlying complaint . . . .”67 
Though the court rejected the King defendants’ particular argu­
ments, it established principles it would recall in future selective 
enforcement claims. 
The year after it decided King, the SJC revisited the issue of 
selective enforcement in Commonwealth v. Franklin, permitting it 
to more finely tune the applicable legal standard.68  Boston during 
the mid-1970s was a place of great racial tension, and the East Bos­
ton Maverick Street Housing Project, in particular, was the locus of 
ongoing racially motivated conflict.69  The Franklin court described 
the environment in the following way: 
[G]angs of white youths began roaming the housing project, ston­
ing the homes of black residents, breaking their windows, 
firebombing their apartments and assaulting the blacks them­
selves.  When asked to make arrests, the police refused and, in 
some cases, did so mockingly.  When the black residents sought 
to have complaints issued in the East Boston District Court on 
their own, the clerk first held hearings and then refused, although 
he routinely issued complaints against black persons without 
hearings when such complaints were sought by whites.70 
These were the circumstances in which two black men armed them­
selves and were subsequently charged with assault and battery with 
dangerous weapons and the unlawful possession of firearms, among 
other related charges.71  Both men moved to dismiss their indict­
ments for “being selective and racially motivated.”72 
67. Id. 
68. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227 (Mass. 1978). 
69. Id. at 232. See generally JACK TAGER, BOSTON RIOTS: THREE CENTURIES OF 
SOCIAL VIOLENCE 194 (2001) for a discussion on how “[t]he violence that occurred in 
Boston from 1974 to 1976 astounded the nation and smeared its reputation as the cradle 
of liberty and hub of intellectual liberalism.”  East Boston was one of several “defended 
neighborhoods,” where the residents “shared an impulse to stop time, to resist change, 
and to hold fast to an ideal of society as it had been before the upheavals of the 1960s.” 
RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN 
THE 1960S AND 1970S 108-09 (1991).  One of the changes these neighborhoods most 
strongly resisted was the busing of public school children by a city attempting to comply 
with court orders for desegregation. Id. at 1.  Nowhere in Boston did a majority of 
residents strongly support busing, but in several neighborhoods, East Boston included, 
busing was met with “strong disapproval (over 70 percent).” Id. at 109. This disap­
proval was the source of great racial tension and ensuing violence. Id. 
70. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d at 232. 
71. Id. at 230. 
72. Id.  The defendants’ motions were denied, but upon appeal, the SJC found 
error in the trial court’s rulings and remanded the case for a new hearing. Id. at 230-31. 
The SJC noted that this had been a case of first impression for the trial court, and that 
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312 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
Drawing from a large array of federal and state cases, and 
building on the principles established in King, the SJC formulated 
the following selective enforcement legal standard.73  In order to 
meet the initial burden in raising a reasonable inference of imper­
missible discrimination, defendants must demonstrate (1) “that a 
broader class of persons than those prosecuted has violated the 
law,” (2) “that failure to prosecute was either consistent or deliber­
ate,” and (3) “that the decision not to prosecute was based on an 
impermissible classification such as race, religion, or sex.”74  Once a 
defendant has satisfied this tripartite burden, the prosecution must 
rebut the inference or suffer a dismissal of the underlying claim.75 
The SJC found that the defendants had successfully raised a reason­
able inference that the prosecution had been motivated by the im­
permissible classification of race.76  The onus, then, was transferred 
onto the prosecution to rebut that inference.77 
2.	 Sharpening the Sword for a Robust Defense: Recent 
Selective Enforcement Cases on Evidentiary and 
Discovery Matters78 
In some instances where defendants have made a selective en­
forcement claim, the proper remedy is the suppression of evidence 
rather than a total dismissal of the charges.79  Pursuant to the exclu­
sionary rule80 and the related fruits doctrine,81 evidence obtained in 
the course of unconstitutional police conduct cannot be used to ob­
“the judge was presented with a constitutional concept (discriminatory enforcement) as 
to which there were no Massachusetts precedents for his guidance.” Id. at 231 n.3. 
While Commonwealth v. King addresses the issue of sex-based selective enforcement, 
that case was decided by the SJC after the Franklin trial had been concluded. Id. 
73.	 Id. at 233-34. 
74.	 Id. 
75.	 Id. at 234. 
76.	 Id. 
77.	 Id. 
78.	 See supra note 53 for a brief discussion of the “sword defense.” 
79. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008) (explaining that 
suppression was the proper remedy in a case where “[the defendant] does not contend 
that he was charged . . . because of his race, and consequently has not moved to dismiss 
[the] charge on the ground of selective enforcement[,]” but rather that the vehicle was 
stopped because of its occupants’ skin color) (emphasis added). 
80. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 647 (9th ed. 2009) (“A [ ] rule that excludes or 
suppresses evidence.”). 
81. See id. at 740 (“The rule that evidence derived from an illegal search, arrest, 
or interrogation is inadmissible because the evidence (the ‘fruit’) was tainted by the 
illegality (the ‘poisonous tree’).”). 
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313 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
tain a conviction.82  Suppression is considered appropriate to deter 
future police misconduct.83 
Suppressing cocaine seized from the defendant would have 
been the appropriate remedy in Commonwealth v. Lora had the 
defendant successfully demonstrated selective enforcement.84  In 
Lora, a police officer pulled over a vehicle when its driver commit­
ted a minor traffic infraction.85  Before activating his cruiser’s blue 
lights, the officer observed the dark skin color of the vehicle’s occu­
pants.86  In the course of the traffic stop, the officer discovered co­
caine in a small glassine bag on the floor of the vehicle.87  The 
defendant filed a motion to suppress in response to the charge of 
trafficking cocaine.88  He alleged that the officer had made the deci­
sion to pull over the vehicle because of its occupants’ skin color, 
thus “impermissibly engag[ing] in the practice of racial profiling.”89 
The SJC in Lora—though it ruled against the defendant— 
made a significant contribution to the law of selective enforcement. 
First, it held that the suppression of evidence is indeed the proper 
remedy in cases where traffic stops are the result of racial profil­
ing.90  Furthermore, the court ruled that a defendant may use statis­
tical evidence to meet the initial burden of “rais[ing] a reasonable 
inference of impermissible discrimination.”91  Nevertheless, the 
82. See Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 698 (“The suppression of evidence under the exclu­
sionary rule is a ‘judicially created remedy,’ whose ‘prime purpose is to deter future 
unlawful police conduct.’”) (citations omitted). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 691.  The driver had failed to operate in the right travel lane. Id. 
86. Id.  The defendant was riding in the passenger’s seat of the vehicle. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 692. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 699.  Still, the court noted that the evidence should not be suppressed 
on these grounds if “the connection between the unconstitutional stop by the police and 
the discovery of the challenged evidence has ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the 
taint.’” Id. at 699-700. 
Racial profiling can be defined as “when law enforcement interprets race as ‘a 
mark of increased risk of criminality.’” Steven Wu, Comment, The Secret Ambition of 
Racial Profiling, 115 YALE L.J. 491, 492 (2005) (citations omitted).  In the context of 
traffic stops, racial profiling “has resulted in the proportion of African-Americans 
among the drivers searched by police far exceeding the proportion in the general popu­
lation of drivers.”  Melissa Whitney, Note, The Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling in 
Traffic Stops and Searches: Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatory In­
tent, 49 B.C. L. REV. 263, 264 (2008) (internal brackets and quotations omitted). 
91. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 701; cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287, 293 (1987) 
(concluding that “statistical proof normally must present a ‘stark’ pattern to be ac­
cepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the Constitution” in a case 
where a black defendant unsuccessfully sought to demonstrate that his death sentence 
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314 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
court was not persuaded that the evidence provided by the instant 
defendant was sufficient to meet this burden.92 
At the conclusion of its Lora decision, the SJC noted that 
“[t]he practical weight” of the defendant’s initial burden to produce 
evidence that similarly situated persons were treated differently be­
cause of their race may be “daunting.”93  Yet, the court opined, the 
hurdle was not “impossible” to surmount.94  One manner in which a 
defendant may seek to demonstrate selective enforcement is by way 
of evidence obtained from the prosecution through discovery.95 
Both the Supreme Court and the SJC have considered the same 
question: what is “the showing necessary for a defendant to be enti­
tled to discovery on a claim that the prosecuting attorney singled 
him out for prosecution on the basis of [an impermissible classifica­
tion?]”96  In the past few years, several cases have come before the 
SJC that have permitted it to develop its response to this question. 
was unconstitutional, because based on a statistical analysis of over 2,000 murder cases, 
black defendants convicted of murdering white victims were more likely to be sen­
tenced to death than any other sort of defendant/victim pairings in racial makeup). But 
see Jones v. Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271, 1279 (Ariz. 2005) (“[W]hile helpful, purely statisti­
cal evidence is rarely sufficient to support an equal protection claim.”) (citations 
omitted). 
92. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 704.  The court came to “the inescapable conclusion that 
the use of census benchmarking to compare the demographics of a small community 
with citation ratios on a major interstate highway, which happens to pass through it, is 
unreliable and not accepted in the scientific community.” Id. at 702.  See also State v. 
Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) for a discussion of the use of statisti­
cal evidence in demonstrating the existence of racial profiling.  “Statistics may be used 
to make out a case of targeting minorities . . . provided the comparison is between the 
racial composition of the motorist population violating the traffic laws and the racial 
composition of those arrested for traffic infractions on the relevant roadway patrolled 
by the police agency.” Id. at 360. Soto was successful in demonstrating racial profiling, 
while Lora was not, because the two defendants measured the alleged examples of 
racially-motivated traffic stops against different benchmarks. See Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 
702 (“Having concluded that properly gathered, analyzed, and relevant statistical data 
may be used to meet a defendant’s burden”—as was the case in Soto—the court then 
found that Lora’s benchmarking data was “unreliable and not accepted in the scientific 
community.”). 
93. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 703.  For a discussion of a related issue—the barriers to 
demonstrating discriminatory impact faced by plaintiffs in equal protection suits in re­
sponse to law enforcement abuses—see generally Whitney, supra note 90, at 282. 
94. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 703. 
95. Vassell, for example, sought to obtain discovery that would aid him in demon­
strating selective enforcement.  Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Mo­
tion for Discovery Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 
2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Motion for Discovery]. 
96. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996).  In this sort of discovery 
request, the SJC has provided a more reasonable threshold requirement for defendants 
than the United States Supreme Court, which has made it practically impossible for 
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315 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
In two racial profiling cases decided on the same day as Lora, 
the SJC held that the defendants were not entitled to the discovery 
they had requested from the Commonwealth pursuant to Rule 14 of 
the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.97  The court rea­
soned that unless a defendant can make a preliminary showing that 
a reasonable basis exists to require the information sought, the dis­
covery rule cannot be used “to impose such an onerous burden on 
the Commonwealth.”98  In the first case, Commonwealth v. 
Betances, the defendant was charged with trafficking heroin and co­
caine after he was stopped for driving erratically.99  In the second 
case, Commonwealth v. Thomas, the defendant was charged with 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute after he was 
stopped for speeding and failure to operate in the right travel 
lane.100  Both defendants sought discovery from the Common­
wealth that would have aided them in making a Lora-like suppres­
sion motion, but in both cases, the SJC rebuffed their efforts.101 
Still, the court noted that “a properly presented and documented 
motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(a)(2) . . . may be an appropriate 
defendants to obtain discovery from the government. See supra Part II.A.  In Arm-
strong, the defendants sought evidence from the government regarding the prosecution 
of cocaine offenses in federal court in their effort to demonstrate race-based selective 
prosecution. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458-59.  The Supreme Court held that they “failed 
to satisfy the threshold showing: They failed to show that the Government declined to 
prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races.” Id. at 458.  Because the evidence 
they provided of race-based prosecution was not sufficient to entitle them to obtain 
discovery from the prosecution, the defendants were effectively barred from substanti­
ating their selective enforcement claim. 
97. See Commonwealth v. Betances, 886 N.E.2d 679 (Mass. 2008); Common­
wealth v. Thomas, 886 N.E.2d 684 (Mass. 2008). Rule 14(a)(1)(A) of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires 
the Commonwealth to furnish facts and information “relevant to the case and 
. . . in the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor, persons under the 
prosecutor’s direction and control, or persons who have participated in investi­
gating or evaluating the case and either regularly report to the prosecutor’s 
office or have done so in the case.” 
Betances, 886 N.E.2d at 682.  Another avenue for discovery is through Rule 14(a)(2), 
which permits the defendant to move for discovery of “other material and relevant 
evidence not required by subdivision (a)(1).” Id. at 683 n.6 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
98. Id. at 683. 
99. Id. at 680-81. 
100. Thomas, 886 N.E.2d at 685. 
101. See Betances, 886 N.E.2d at 683 (finding that the defendant’s discovery mo­
tion, accompanied by two unrelated police reports noting the races of the arrestees, did 
not “contain reliable information . . . demonstrating a reasonable basis to infer that 
profiling” had occurred); Thomas, 886 N.E.2d at 686-87 (finding that the defendant’s 
discovery motions, seeking materials from the arresting officer that would demonstrate 
the occurrence of racial profiling, “were vague and overbroad”). 
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316 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
vehicle by which a defendant . . . may obtain statistical evidence 
required, under the Lora decision, to demonstrate [racial 
profiling].”102 
In two subsequent statutory rape cases, the SJC was presented 
with similar Rule 14 discovery motions, and in both cases, the court 
found in favor of the defendant.103 Commonwealth v. Bernardo B. 
illuminates the importance of Rule 14 discovery for defendants 
seeking to demonstrate selective enforcement.104  There, a four­
teen-year-old boy was charged with nine counts of sexual offenses 
for consensual acts he engaged in with three younger female 
peers.105  Since the girls were not charged, though they had also 
violated the law, the boy sought discovery “in order to investigate 
and, if possible, support his claim that he was being selectively pros­
ecuted because of his [sex].”106  The court wondered where else 
than the prosecutor’s office could the boy “look to. . . as the most 
comprehensive, reliable source of raw information from which to 
develop” his selective enforcement claim.107 
The Commonwealth’s argument in opposition tracked the gov­
ernment’s in Armstrong—that the defendant’s request failed to 
raise a reasonable inference that the prosecutor had declined to 
prosecute “similarly situated individuals.”108  Yet, the SJC—unlike 
the Supreme Court—recognized that requiring this kind of showing 
“put[s] the cart before the horse.”109  The court explained that: 
“[t]he reasonable inference” standard asks whether the defen­
dant, seeking dismissal of the charges against him, has made a 
prima facie case of selective prosecution. What the boy seeks 
here is discovery, not dismissal.  At the discovery stage, the ques­
102. Thomas, 886 N.E.2d at 687. 
103. See Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 2010); Com­
monwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834 (Mass. 2009).  In Washington W., the defen­
dant alleged selective prosecution based on sexual orientation. Washington W., 928 
N.E.2d at 910.  The SJC found that the defendant was “foreclosed from making a 
proper threshold showing of relevance, in light of the facts of the case and the inaccessi­
ble nature of juvenile court records.” Id. at 914.  Still, the court ruled that “the juve­
nile’s claim is sufficiently serious to warrant further inquiry.” Id.  Therefore, the court 
ordered limited discovery that would potentially enable the defendant to make a show­
ing of relevance, such that would entitle him to full discovery. Id. at 915. 
104. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d. 834. 
105. Id. at 837.  At the time of the sexual encounters, the defendant was fourteen, 
two of the females were twelve, and one was eleven. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 843. 
108. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). 
109. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d at 843 (internal quotations omitted). 
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317 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
tion is whether the defendant has made a “threshold showing of 
relevance” under rule 14(a)(2).  To adopt the higher burden sug­
gested by the Commonwealth would place criminal defendants in 
the untenable position of having to produce evidence of selective 
enforcement in order to obtain evidence of selective 
enforcement.110 
Applying this legal standard, the court held that the defendant had 
indeed made a threshold showing by demonstrating that his “be­
havior was [not] so dissimilar from that of the girls in nature, kind, 
and degree as to nullify the possibility that his discovery request 
might yield information relevant to a claim of selective prosecu­
tion.”111  Accordingly, he was entitled to the requested discovery.112 
Over the past quarter century, the SJC has developed a strong 
body of law for Massachusetts defendants seeking to demonstrate 
selective enforcement.  The earlier cases, King and Franklin, estab­
lished the tripartite burden, which Lora reaffirmed.113  In their ef­
forts to meet their initial burden, defendants may employ statistical 
evidence and are able to obtain discovery from the Commonwealth 
in order to corroborate their claims.114  These are all valuable tools 
for protecting defendants from impermissible discrimination in the 
enforcement and prosecution of criminal laws.  What the law lacks, 
however, is an acknowledgment of privilege—the inverse of dis­
crimination—which functions implicitly in many selective enforce­
ment cases. 
110. Id. at 843-44 (citation omitted).  The SJC makes no reference to United 
States v. Armstrong in its decision.  But with this statement, it clearly rejects the Su­
preme Court’s established legal standard for defendants seeking discovery in selective 
enforcement claims, establishing, as is its prerogative, greater protections for the citi­
zens of Massachusetts than for the citizens of the United States. 
111. Id. at 846.  The SJC also found that the defendant’s requests were material 
and relevant to his claim of sex-based selective prosecution, and that they were properly 
supported. Id. at 847. 
112. Id. at 846. 
113. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008) (internal quota­
tions, citations, and ellipses omitted). The SJC in Lora explained that 
In order to meet [the initial] burden, the defendant must . . . present evidence 
which raises at least a reasonable inference of impermissible discrimination, 
including evidence [1] that a broader class of persons than those prosecuted 
has violated the law, [2] that failure to prosecute was either consistent or delib­
erate, and [3] that the decision not to prosecute was based on an impermissible 
classification such as race, religion, or sex. 
Id.  As previously discussed, this standard was originally set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 233-34 (Mass. 1978). 
114. See Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 2010); Ber­
nardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834; Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688. 
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III. WHITE PRIVILEGE: VERY REAL, ENTIRELY
 
UNEARNED BENEFITS
 
Raising the issue of white privilege in his motion to dismiss for 
selective prosecution would have provided Jason Vassell with mea­
ger doctrinal justification upon which to rest his legal argument. 
The law simply does not acknowledge the advantages and privileges 
that white people experience in their encounters with law enforce­
ment.115  At the same time, white privilege implicitly undergirds the 
law of selective enforcement.  The next segment of this Note pro­
vides an overview of white privilege, a discussion of the case law’s 
failure to engage in any meaningful discourse on white privilege, 
and a look at how white privilege played a role in the arrest and 
prosecution of Jason Vassell. 
A. An Overview of White Privilege 
“White privilege, a collective assortment of various conceptual 
definitions,”116 has been described by scholars and activists in a va­
riety of ways that range in form from highly technical dictionary-
like definitions to narratives rich with real life examples.117  Peggy 
McIntosh describes white privilege as an 
invisible package of unearned assets which [a white person] can 
count on cashing in each day, but about which [she or he] was 
“meant” to remain oblivious.  White privilege is like an invisible 
115. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 8 (“The notion of privilege, although part of the 
consciousness of popular culture, has not been recognized in legal language and 
doctrine.”). 
116. Maurice R. Dyson, When Government is a Passive Participant in Private Dis­
crimination: A Critical Look at White Privilege & the Tacit Return to Interposition in 
PICS v. Seattle School District, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 164 (2008). 
117. For an example of a dictionary-like definition of white privilege, see Defin­
ing “White Privilege”, RACE, RACISM AND THE  LAW: SPEAKING  TRUTH TO  POWER! 
http://academic.udayton.edu/race/01race/whiteness05.htm (last updated Dec. 31, 2010) 
(describing white privilege as a “social relation” that can be manifested in a number of 
ways, such as the “right[s], advantage[s], or immunit[ies] granted to or enjoyed by white 
persons beyond the common advantage of all others”). 
For an example of a narrative definition of white privilege, see Tim Wise, White 
Privilege, White Entitlement and the 2008 Election, BUZZFLASH.COM (Sept. 13, 2008), 
http://blog.buzzflash.com/contributors/1755.  Wise provides the following examples of 
white privilege: 
[W]hen you can get pregnant at seventeen like Bristol Palin and everyone is 
quick to insist that your life and that of your family is a personal matter, and 
that no one has a right to judge you or your parents, because “every family has 
challenges,” even as black and Latino families with similar “challenges” are 
regularly typified as irresponsible, pathological and arbiters of social decay. 
Id. 
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weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, 
maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, 
emergency gear, and blank checks.118 
The contents of the invisible knapsack benefit white people in 
countless ways—from the comfort in finding members of their race 
represented in textbooks and popular media, to never having to 
wonder whether they were targeted by the police because of their 
race in a traffic stop.119 
In her article, Teaching Whren to White Kids, M. K. B. Darmer 
describes an instance in which she experienced the comfort and se­
curity of her white privilege when her vehicle was pulled over by a 
police officer: 
[D]espite a slight case of nerves, I was pretty sure of what would 
happen and, more importantly, what would not happen: I would 
not be frisked.  I would not be pulled out of my car.  I would not 
be asked if I had a weapon.  I would not be asked if there were 
drugs in the car.  I would not be asked if I had a criminal record. 
I would not be treated harshly.  My whiteness endows me with 
benefits that were realized that day.120 
Similarly, Jacob Willig-Onwuachi writes that he is “reminded of 
[his] own white privilege when [he] shop[s]. . . and [is] neither fol­
lowed around in stores nor asked to produce various forms of iden­
tification when purchasing items.”121  Both of these accounts attest 
118. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 17-18 (citing Peggy McIntosh, Unpacking the 
Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, CREATION SPIRITUALITY, Jan.-Feb. 1992 at 34). 
119. Peggy McIntosh, in her essay, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knap­
sack, available at http://www.nymbp.org/reference/WhitePrivilege.pdf (last visited Apr. 
15, 2012), enumerates twenty-six ways in which she believes she benefits from white 
privilege.  Several examples include: 
I can if I wish arrange to be in the company of people of my race most of the 
time . . . When I am told about our national heritage or about “civilization,” I 
am shown that people of my color made it what it is . . . Whether I use checks, 
credit cards or cash, I can count on my skin color not to work against the 
appearance of my financial reliability . . . I am never asked to speak for all the 
people of my racial group . . . I can be pretty sure that if I ask to talk to “the 
person in charge,” I will be facing a person of my race [and] . . . If a traffic cop 
pulls me over or if the IRS audits my tax return, I can be sure I haven’t been 
singled out because of my race. 
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 703 (Mass. 2008) (acknowledging 
the problem of “police profiling, commonly referred to as ‘DWB—driving while 
black.’”). 
120. Darmer, supra note 27, at 113. 
121. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, Special Project, A 
House Divided: The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
231, 232 (2009). 
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to the large array of privileges that white people experience due 
only to their skin color.122 
White privilege, though exceedingly powerful, is largely unseen 
by white people.123  One cause of its invisibleness to white people is 
that “the characteristics of the privileged group define the societal 
norm.”124  Imagine that every house you have ever seen in your 
entire life were painted the color red.  If this were so, you would not 
necessarily notice when a friend painted her new home red. You 
would not notice the color of your friend’s house, because as far as 
you are concerned, there is nothing to notice.  In your eyes, house 
color = red.  Similarly, when a white person “turn[s] on the televi­
sion or open[s] to the front page of the paper [she or he] see[s] 
122. The inverse is also true: people of color experience “a lack, an absence, a 
deficiency” due to white privilege. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 17 (emphasis added). 
When a black person “read[s] the newspaper, watch[es] television, or listen[s] to the 
news . . . [she or he is bombarded with] negative and stereotypical images of black 
people.”  Onwuachi-Willig & Willig-Onwuachi, supra note 121, at 222, 232. When Joey 
Mazzarino, head writer of Sesame Street, observed his daughter—who is black—play­
ing with her dolls, he noticed that she “wanted to have long blond hair and straight hair, 
and she wanted to be able to bounce it around.”  “I Love My Hair”: A Father’s Tribute 
to his Daughter, NATIONAL  PUBLIC  RADIO (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.npr.org/tem­
plates/story/story.php?storyId=130653300.  The societal norm of what hair should look 
like has been defined by the privileged group (when white people purchase toys for 
their children, it is easy to find their own physical attributes represented), and conse­
quently people of color experience the absence of privilege in this context, as well. 
123. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 17 (“[White] privilege is not visible to its holder; 
it is merely there, a part of the world, a way of life, simply the way things are.”).  Mar­
galynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: 
Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 635, 645 (2008) (“While 
mainstream thought in the United States would now consider white supremacy to be 
morally repugnant and explicitly rejected, white privilege remains largely 
unacknowledged.”). 
Professors Darmer and Willig-Onwuachi are exceptions to the rule that white peo­
ple do not perceive their white privilege.  Certainly, some white people have strived to 
perceive the privilege that their skin color affords them.  Even those who make this 
effort, however, doubtlessly fail to observe every instance of white privilege.  And even 
in instances where they observe their privilege, they may silently enjoy it because to 
confront it would be uncomfortable or inconvenient. See infra notes 128-132 and ac­
companying text. 
124. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 13 (citation omitted); see also BRUCE A. JA­
COBS, RACE  MANNERS: NAVIGATING THE  MINEFIELD  BETWEEN  BLACK AND  WHITE 
AMERICANS 106 (1999).  Jacobs describes the normalization of whiteness: 
[W]hite culture [is kept] firmly at the center of approved American reality 
while the perceived “ethnic” cultures whirl about as orbiting social satellites. 
By this definition, the sound of salsa music blaring from an apartment window 
and the wafting aroma of a black chicken-and-ribs restaurant are both “eth­
nic,” while the munching of a tuna sandwich on white bread by a white Anglo-
Saxon man in green pants is, hysterically enough, “normal.” 
Id. 
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321 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
people of [her or his] race widely represented.”125  Because the so­
cietal norm is defined by whiteness,126 white people commonly fail 
to perceive whiteness and fail to question the privileges it confers 
upon them.127 
Another reason why white privilege is largely invisible to white 
people is due to their inclination to “rely on their privilege and 
avoid objecting to oppression.”128  Describing an experience that 
she had while performing jury duty, Stephanie Wildman recalls how 
she considered challenging the racist assumptions made by an attor­
ney during voir dire when she noticed that the attorney asked all 
Asian-looking prospective jurors if they spoke English.129  She con­
templated introducing herself in the following way: “I’m Stephanie 
Wildman, I’m a professor of law, and yes, I speak English,” to call 
attention to the attorney’s “subordinating conduct.”130  Instead, she 
decided to “opt out” and exercise her privilege by remaining silent 
on the matter.131  Even white people who are committed to chal­
lenging oppression can fall back into the comfort of their privilege 
when it would be inconvenient or uncomfortable to do so. Thus, 
“the implicit option to ignore oppression” is yet another object of 
value in the invisible knapsack.132 
125. McIntosh, supra note 119. 
126. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 14 (“The characteristics and attributes of those 
who are privileged group members are described as societal norms—as the way things 
are and as what is normal in society.”) (citation omitted). 
127. Id. at 17 (stating that “[p]rivilege is not visible to its holder; it is merely 
there, a part of the world, a way of life, simply the way things are”); see also Coker, 
supra note 19, at 870 (“Whites seldom think of themselves through the lens of race; 
whiteness is invisible to most whites.”). 
128. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 13. 
129. Id. at 16. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 13-14.  White privilege, as understood by scholars like Professors 
Wildman, Darmer, and McIntosh builds upon the “black critical reflection on the ways 
and means of whiteness.”  Ronald E. Chennault, Giving Whiteness a Black Eye: An 
Interview with Michael Eric Dyson, in WHITE  REIGN: DEPLOYING  WHITENESS IN 
AMERICA 305 (Joe L. Kincheloe et al. eds., 1998).  The contemporary study of white­
ness owes a great “debt to [the] hidden black intellectual tradition” of W.E.B. DuBois, 
Langston Hughes, Zora Neale Hurston, and Fannie Lou Hamer, among others. Id. 
While a discussion of these origins is beyond the scope of this Note, the author wishes 
to acknowledge this debt. 
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B.	 Blind-Spots and Belittlement: How the Case Law Has 
Regarded White Privilege 
Despite the reality of white privilege133 and the rich documen­
tation of its existence by both academics and activists, the courts 
have never considered the topic in any meaningful way. A Westlaw 
search of all state and federal cases for decisions that contain the 
phrase “white privilege” produces seventeen results.134  Two cases 
document “[t]he efforts of non-Native American adherents to 
adopt Indian religions” and how in their efforts they may benefit 
from white privilege.135  Several other cases operate in the employ­
ment discrimination context, and generally characterize white privi­
lege as a concept that provides an exceedingly unpersuasive basis 
upon which to rest any legal reasoning.136  One case addresses the 
133. Some people deny the existence of white privilege. Tim Wise responds to 
the “deniers” in his blog piece, Explaining White Privilege to the Deniers and the Haters, 
RED  ROOM (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.redroom.com/blog/tim-wise/explaining-white­
privilege-deniers-and-haters. 
134. Westlaw Search of “All State and Federal Cases,” https://law­
school.westlaw.com (follow “Westlaw” hyperlink; then search “Terms & Connectors” 
for “white privilege”).  Six of these cases do not address white privilege, but rather 
contain misleading phrases, which the search engine is not capable of distinguishing, 
such as “White’s privilege” (referring to the defendant, White, and his privilege against 
self-incrimination). See United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1516 (Ind. 1989); see also 
Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1980); I.C.C. v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1980); 
White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 1986 WL 965, No. 03-0051-H (W.D. Va., June 
12, 1986); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44 (N.D. Cal 1971); Munroe v. 
Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 254 S.W. 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). 
135. See United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137, 1154-55 (D. Utah 
2009) for an example of a court inquiring into whether non-Native Americans who 
adhere to Native American religions should be entitled to possess eagle feathers for 
religious purposes in violation of existing federal laws designed to protect endangered 
bird species.  The court held that the government failed to demonstrate that its ban on 
the possession of eagle feathers as applied to the non-native American defendants was 
“the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interests.” Id.  In dicta, the 
court described how some commentators decry the efforts of “New Agers” to “play 
Indian” by appropriating Native American religions all the while retaining “the white 
privilege and power to make themselves heard at the expense of [N]ative Americans.” 
Id. at 1137; see also United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 2009) 
(dealing with the same issue as Hardman). 
136. See Bowman-Farrell v. Cooperative Educ. Serv. Agency 8, No. 02-C-818, 
2007 WL 3046283, at *6, *30 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 17, 2007) (granting summary judgment to 
defendants where plaintiffs argued that both racism and white privilege were responsi­
ble for the discrimination they alleged to have occurred); Wilcoxon v. Ramsey Action 
Programs, Inc., No. 04-92 (JRT/FLN), 2005 WL 2216289, at *2, *7 (D. Minn. Sept. 12, 
2005) (granting summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff had circulated an 
email on white privilege prior to her dismissal); Scott v. Univ. of N.H. Co-op Extension, 
No. 03-027-M, 2004 WL 235258, at *3 n.5, *4, *10 (D.N.H., Feb. 9, 2004) (granting 
summary judgment to the defendant after noting that “[the plaintiff’s] invocation of 
‘white privilege,’ without more, is insufficient to state a claim under Title VII”); Cole­
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constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).137  In 
her dissent, the Honorable Bobbe J. Bridge analogizes DOMA to 
“segregation laws [once] sought to ‘defend’ white-privilege from 
people of color.”138  Though some courts may recognize the exis­
tence of white privilege, none of them has engaged with it in any 
meaningful way. 
The single Supreme Court decision wherein the phrase, “white 
privilege” appears is Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Se­
attle School District.139  There, the Court held that the goal of creat­
ing racially diverse schools must not be achieved by way of 
“assigning students on a racial basis.”140  In his concurrence, Justice 
Thomas extolled a “color-blind Constitution” that cannot tolerate 
“[elite] racial theories [such as] cultural racism141 [or] white privi­
lege.”142  Justice Thomas provided these two concepts as examples 
of what happens when “local school boards . . . [are] entrusted with 
the power to make decisions on the basis of race.”143  Thomas’s 
quip suggests that it is repugnant for a school board to encourage 
man v. Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 593, 622 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (finding that a 
white employee’s opinions on an article entitled “White Privileges” that amounted to a 
criticism of affirmative action was not the equivalent of racial bias in a Title VII em­
ployment discrimination claim); Rylander v. Hasart, 2001 WL 1346791, No. 25675-4-II, 
at *4, *12 (Wash. App. Div. Nov. 2, 2001) (rejecting on relevancy grounds the white 
male plaintiff’s argument that materials on white privilege viewed by a hiring commit­
tee demonstrated “an intent to inject race into the . . . hiring process”). But see Miller 
v. Cont’l Can Co., 544 F. Supp. 210, 229 (D.C. Ga. 1981) (noting that the delay in 
making a merger between pulp and paper mills “of approximately two years [was a] 
vain attempt to protect white privilege”). 
137. Anderson v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1010 (Wash. 2006) (holding that 
“Washington’s long-standing definition of marriage as the union of one man and one 
woman and DOMA are both constitutional”). 
138. Id. at 1030 (Bridge, J. dissenting).  Justice Bridge’s use of the phrase, “white 
privilege,” seems to connote “white supremacy,” a different—more deliberate and 
overt—system of domination. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Operatively White?: Explor­
ing the Significance of Race and Class Through the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness, 
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 165 (2009) (describing a societal and economic struc­
ture based on white privilege as “seemingly less-virulent . . . [and] more-benign” than 
the structure of white supremacy that preceded it). 
139. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 781 n.30 
(2007). 
140. Id. at 747. 
141. Justice Thomas cited a former Seattle school district website containing the 
following definition of cultural racism: “Those aspects of society that overtly and co­
vertly attribute value and normality to white people and whiteness, and devalue, stereo­
type, and label people of color as ‘other,’ different, less than, or render them invisible.” 
Id. at 781 n.30 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
142. Id. at 781. 
143. Id. at 781 n.30. 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 166 S
ide B
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 166 Side B      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE108.txt unknown Seq: 24  1-MAY-12 10:39
R
R
R
R
R
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members of its community to engage in any sort of dialogue on 
matters having to do with power and privilege. 
None of these cases provides any legal language or frameworks 
with which to discuss white privilege.144  Though not all courts dis­
parage the concept of white privilege in the manner of one Su­
preme Court justice,145 none considers it meaningfully or even 
attempts to carve out a narrow entryway through which the concept 
might be introduced to legal doctrine.146  Far from being an elitist 
theory,147 white privilege affects criminal defendants’ experiences 
in very real ways.  Still, it seems that white privilege remains invisi­
ble in the courtroom. 
C. The Function of White Privilege in Commonwealth v. Vassell 
Vassell’s motion to dismiss for selective prosecution identified 
racism as a motivating factor in much of the UMPD’s conduct and 
the DA’s handling of the case.148  Undoubtedly, Vassell and his at­
torneys were aware of the role that white privilege played in his 
case.  No formal mechanism existed, however, by which they could 
raise the issue.  Consequently, they were confined to identifying ra­
144. Professor Wildman describes how “privilege . . . has [never] found articula­
tion in the legal vocabulary.” WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 141. 
145. See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch., 551 U.S. at 781 n.30 (Thomas, J. 
concurring). 
146. See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text. 
147. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 781 n.30 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
148. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 46 (stating that “racism is the only plau­
sible explanation for the criminal charges . . . pending” against Vassell). Certainly there 
was good reason to identify racism as playing a role in the prosecution. After all, “Ja­
son Vassell was the target of a racist hate crime,” Jason’s Story, JUSTICE FOR  JASON, 
http://www.justiceforjason.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012), and yet the DA refused to 
recognize this fact at any stage in the prosecution. See Commonwealth’s Opposition, 
supra note 4.  The DA described the Commonwealth’s “race neutral factual basis for 
[Vassell’s] indictment” as stemming from the “defendant’s acts of repeatedly stabbing, 
without legal justification or excuse, two unarmed men.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
That Vassell was “terrified” when Bowes and Bosse attacked him—that he believed “if 
[he didn’t] do something, [he would] die”—played no role in the prosecution’s handling 
of the case.  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 11 (internal quotations omitted).  Re­
cording artist and UMass student Giddens W. Rateau described the racism underlying 
Vassell’s prosecution in the following way: “[Bowes and Bosse] tried to steal his rights 
. . . / But then Jason saved his life with a pocketknife / But here’s the great schism / You 
look me in my eye and say he’s going to prison?” Justice for Jason Campaign at UMass 
Amherst, YOUTUBE at 2:10 (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9gnyFv 
XXh8. 
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325 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
cism as the cause of the differential treatment afforded the partici­
pants of the February 3rd altercation.149 
Before discussing the function of white privilege in Common­
wealth v. Vassell, this section provides a summary of the court pro­
ceedings dealing with Vassell’s Motion to Dismiss for selective 
prosecution.  Many of Vassell’s arguments allude to white privilege 
in the same way that the selective enforcement legal standard does: 
both illuminate the invisible knapsack without ever explicitly nam­
ing it or its contents. 
1.	 Jason Vassell’s Motion to Dismiss for Selective
 
Prosecution
 
On December 29, 2008, Vassell’s counsel filed a motion to dis­
miss the charges against him on the grounds of selective prosecu­
tion.150  In the memorandum of law in support of this motion, 
defense counsel noted that “[p]rior to raising the specter of an im­
permissible motive in this case, [they had] conducted a rigorous 
evaluation of the evidence and sought alternative explanations for 
each questionable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”151  How­
ever, the motion argued, a conclusion that the DA had engaged in 
race-based selective prosecution was unavoidable.152  As evidence 
of this claim, defense counsel argued that Bosse, who was not 
charged with any crime, could have been charged with four sepa­
rate felonies “as either a principal or joint venturer with Bowes.”153 
At a minimum, Vassell’s attorneys argued, Bosse should have been 
149. In oral argument for Vassell’s Motion for Discovery, Attorney David Hoose 
explained, “we don’t make the[se] allegations lightly.  I’m not suggesting for a minute 
that [the prosecutors have] a Ku Klux Klan flag in their office, or that someone at some 
point in time said, ‘He’s black.  Let’s just prosecute a black person.’  Racism is a lot 
more subtle than that.”  Hearing on Motion for Discovery before the Honorable Judd 
Carhart at 12, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 
2009) [hereinafter Discovery Hearing].  Although Attorney Hoose may have been re­
ferring to less explicit forms of racism such as unconsciously-held bias, see supra note 
27 and accompanying text, he may also have been alluding to white privilege as a sub­
tler relation to racism. 
150. Lawyers File Motion to Dismiss; Cite Racist Selective Prosecution, JUSTICE 
FOR JASON, http://www.justiceforjason.org/motion (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
151. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 46. 
152. Id. at 51. 
153. Id. at 37.  The four separate felonies enumerated were: Civil Rights Viola­
tion with Bodily Injury, Assault or Battery for Purpose of Intimidation, Entering with­
out Breaking at Night with Intent to Commit a Felony, and Malicious Destruction of 
Property. Id. 
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prosecuted for five separate misdemeanor offenses.154  Addition­
ally, the motion asserted that the Commonwealth failed to prose­
cute Bowes as aggressively as his conduct warranted, which 
“demonstrated [an] indifference to the fate of Jason Vassell, as well 
as [to] the safety of other people of color in the community.”155  All 
this evinced that “the District Attorney [had] engaged in selective 
prosecution on the basis of race.”156  Accordingly, defense counsel 
argued that the indictment should have been dismissed.157 
To further pursue the claim of selective prosecution, Vassell’s 
counsel filed a motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 14 of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.158  This request be­
came the subject of much dispute, resulting in a review by a single 
SJC Justice.159  Finally, on October 7, 2009, a Superior Court Order 
ruled in favor of Vassell’s motion, finding that “[he had] met his 
burden of showing that the [discovery requests were] material and 
relevant to his claim of race-based selective prosecution.”160 
154. Id. at 42-43.  The five separate misdemeanors enumerated were: Assault and 
Battery, Threat to Commit a Crime, Disorderly Conduct, Defacement of Injury to State 
Building, and Trespass on Public Property. Id. at 43. 
155. Id. at 51.  Later, defense counsel argued that “the Commonwealth intention­
ally pulled its punches both before and during the Bowes’ [sic] trial in order to avoid 
casting further doubt on the constitutionality of its prosecution of Mr. Vassell.” Motion 
to Strike, supra note 5, at 3.  Specifically, defense counsel noted that the Common­
wealth had moved to amend the charges against Bowes “[to strike] the words ‘with 
injury.’” Id. at 4.  By amending the charges, the Commonwealth was free to prosecute 
Bowes in District, rather than, Superior Court. Id. at 5.  Additionally, defense counsel 
called attention to the fact that the Commonwealth assented to Bowes’s motion to dis­
miss the assault and battery charge against him. Id. at 5-6.  Defense counsel also 
“moved in limine to exclude video evidence of a drunken Bowes taunting and threaten­
ing Mr. Vassell before punching him in the face.” Id. at 7.  Vassell’s defense counsel 
documented other ways in which the Commonwealth appeared to have sabotaged its 
case against Bowes. Id. at 8-18.  All this, Vassell’s counsel argued, demonstrated “that 
[the] prosecutors decided that they would rather lose the District Court case against 
John Bowes than complicate the Superior Court case against Jason Vassell.” Id. at 7. 
156. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 51. 
157. Id. at 52.  In the Commonwealth’s Preliminary Memorandum of Law in Op­
position to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the prosecution averred that the deci­
sion to arrest Jason Vassell was not based on race despite the “regrettable [use of] 
profanity” by an officer of the UMPD.  Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 
12.  The DA did not argue, however, that the decision to prosecute Vassell was free of 
race-based taint.  Rather, the DA argued that the court should defer to “the decisions 
. . . of executive officers” to avoid the “unnecessary impair[ment of] the performance of 
a core executive constitutional function.” Id. at 9. 
158. Motion for Discovery, supra note 95. 
159. Further Findings and Order at 2, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008­
00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Discovery Order]. 
160. Id. at 11. 
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327 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
Despite the DA’s effort to characterize Bowes and Bosse as 
victims,161 the Superior Court found that “[Vassell’s] behavior was 
sufficiently similar to that of Bowes and Bosse ‘in nature, kind and 
degree’ to demonstrate the possibility that his discovery requests 
might yield information relevant to his claim of selective prosecu­
tion.”162  Specifically, the court noted that: 
Vassell was charged with serious offenses in the Superior Court, 
while Bowes was only charged with arguably less serious offenses 
which were significantly reduced on motion by the Common­
wealth.  The Commonwealth’s decision not to proceed against 
161. See Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4.  The DA objected to defense 
counsel’s portrayal of Bowes and Bosse as similarly situated to Vassell. Id. at 10.  In its 
memorandum, the Commonwealth argued that “[Vassell] was the only person armed, 
and thus the only person inflicting knife wounds . . . Bosse and Bowes were not simi­
larly situated to him.” Id.  The Commonwealth’s telling of the events that occurred on 
February 3, 2008 seems aimed at portraying Bowes and Bosse as having been drawn 
into the fight rather than having instigated it: 
Bowes and Bosse . . . stopped at the defendant’s street level room window to
 
ask for assistance for entry into the building. . . .  A verbal argument between
 
the defendant and Bowes ensued.  As the men argued, Bowes cursed at the
 
defendant by uttering profanity and racial epithets or slurs. The encounter
 
culminated in one of the defendant’s room window panes . . . being broken.
 
Id. at 4.  The memorandum employs the passive voice to describe the broken window,
 
thereby enabling the Commonwealth to avoid addressing the issue of who broke the
 
window.  The memorandum described the altercation in the lobby in the following way:
 
[T]he defendant raised the knife in a threatening manner towards Bowes and 
Bosse on multiple occasions . . . .  Bowes reached over . . . and punched the 
defendant’s upper body to disarm him. . . . The defendant responded by stab­
bing Bowes repeatedly as he retreated toward the entrance door . . . .  Bosse 
. . . grabbed at the defendant, punching him, to stop him from stabbing Bowes. 
In response, the defendant stabbed Bosse, repeatedly . . . as Bosse retreated 
away from the defendant toward the inner security door . . . .  No further 
physical interaction occurred between the men and the defendant left the 
lower lobby . . . . 
Id. at 7.  This telling of the events portrays Vassell as the aggressor and Bowes and 
Bosse as the victims.  As such it differs greatly from the account corroborated by multi­
ple eyewitnesses. See supra Part I; see also Petition for Relief, supra note 5.  Further­
more, the DA’s narrative omits the fact that Bowes and Bosse sought to engage with 
Vassell after he had fled the room. See supra Introduction. 
162. Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 8.  Attorney Hoose argued that “[the 
black defendant and his white counterparts] don’t have to be identically situated. They 
just have to be similarly situated.”  Discovery Hearing, supra note 149, at 23 When the 
court issued its discovery request, it stated that the parties were similarly situated for 
purposes of the discovery request, but did not make a final determination on the issue 
as it related to the motion to dismiss. See Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 7.  Com­
pare the Superior Court’s finding to the Supreme Court of the United States’ in Arm-
strong and other selective prosecution cases, which essentially permit “[c]ourts that are 
hostile to selective prosecution claims [to] always find white comparators dissimilar.” 
Coker, supra note 19, at 830. 
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328 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
Bosse at all, and to reduce the charges against Bowes, despite the 
evidence against them, while pursuing far more serious charges 
against Vassell, further supports the reliance and materiality of 
the discovery sought by Vassell.163 
Before the Commonwealth had fully met its discovery obligations, 
the DA offered to dismiss the charges against Vassell if he complied 
with a pretrial probation order.164  Vassell accepted the offer and 
his motion to dismiss was never heard on the merits.165 
2. Bowes and Bosse as Beneficiaries of White Privilege 
White privilege, in the form of benefits conferred upon Bowes 
and Bosse, is the “flipside of [the] discrimination” experienced by 
Vassell.166  In the immediate aftermath of the altercation, officers 
from the UMPD treated Bowes and Bosse with familiarity and con­
cern.167  One of the two officers who interviewed Bosse responded 
to his admission to having had “a few beers”168 by joking, “I wish I 
had a few beers . . . .”169  The second officer playfully admonished 
Bosse, whose Tom Brady jersey had been taken into evidence, that 
“[If the Patriots lose the upcoming Super Bowl] we’re going to give 
your name to the Boston Globe.  It’s all John’s fault.”170  This famil­
iarity and friendliness was completely absent from the officers’ in­
teractions with Vassell.  By treating the participants to the 
altercation in such a disparate manner, the UMPD privileged the 
white participants over the black participant—disregarding the evi­
dence that Vassell, in fact, was the victim.171 
163. Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 9. 
164. Lowe, supra note 39. On August 3, 2010—two and a half years after the 
February 3rd altercation—Vassell’s probationary period ended. Contrada, supra note 
34.  “According to the terms of his agreement, Vassell acknowledged stabbing Bowes 
and Bosse and was allowed to serve out the 21/2-year pre-trial probationary period im­
posed at his arraignment in 2008.  He will have no criminal record because the charges 
against him are expunged.” Id. 
165. Contrada, supra note 34. 
166. Wise, Explaining White Privilege, supra note 133 (explaining how “privilege 
is the flipside of discrimination.  If people of color face discrimination, in housing, em­
ployment and elsewhere, then the rest of us are receiving a de facto subsidy, a privilege, 
an advantage in those realms of daily life.  There can be no down without an up . . .”). 
167. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 14-17. 
168. Id. at 13. 
169. Id. at 14. 
170. Id. at 16. 
171. Bowes and Bosse had become repeat offenders, perhaps for the reason that 
no one had ever addressed their criminal conduct with all due seriousness. Vassell’s 
attorneys asserted that it was clear upon reviewing Bowes’s and Bosse’s police reports 
that the men “had been given literally dozens of breaks by law enforcement yet contin­
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329 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
Certainly evidence of racial bias at this stage of the case is re­
plete.  On several occasions, Vassell was subjected to suspicious and 
hateful conduct by the police.172  The same officer who joked about 
wishing he had a few beers referred to Vassell as an “asshole” and 
“donkey” while discussing the case with another officer.173  He 
urged the second officer to interview Vassell while he was still le­
thargic after receiving medical treatment.174  Additionally, he spec­
ulated that Vassell was a drug dealer without any corroborating 
evidence.175  This antagonism flourished in spite of the UMPD’s of­
ficial and self-proclaimed charge to “[ensure] that all members of 
our community live, work, and learn on campus without concerns 
about safety.”176  So deep was the officers’ racial prejudice that they 
chose to credit violent, white trespassers over a black member of 
their community.  That Bowes and Bosse benefited from this racial 
prejudice is another example of white privilege. 
White privilege continued to function at the prosecutorial 
level.  The charges made against Bowes were minor compared to 
those against his victim.177  Furthermore, by striking “with injury” 
from Count Two of the complaint against Bowes, the DA granted 
Bowes another palpable privilege—the benefit of his case remain­
ing in District rather than Superior Court.178 
ued to commit random, and sometimes racist, acts of violence.”  Second Supplemental 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, Commonwealth v. Vas-
sell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Second Supplemen­
tal Motion].  It is likely that the UMPD officers who interviewed Bowes and Bosse have 
only encouraged their tendency towards lawlessness. 
172. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 9-13. 
173. Id. at 12. 
174. Id. at 13.  In contrast, one of the UMPD officers interviewing Bosse “elected 
to conclude the interview based on his concern that the painkillers might be affecting 
Bosse’s faculties.” Id. at 16. 
175. Id. at 9. 
176. UMASS  AMHERST  POLICE  DEPARTMENT, http://www.umass.edu/umpd (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
177. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 35 (“Vassell face[d] a maximum sentence 
of thirty years in state prison; Bowes face[d] a maximum sentence of four years in the 
house of correction; and Bosse [had] not been charged with a single crime.”). 
178. Id. at 35 (“In taking this action, the Commonwealth effectively turned a 
blind eye to: (i) medical records that show Vassell’s nose was broken; (ii) its own appli­
cation for a criminal complaint which states that Vassell’s nose was broken; [and] (iii) 
. . . a statute that defines bodily injury to include fractures and even something as minor 
as a subdural hematoma.”). Id. 
The decision to amend Count Two by striking the reference to bodily injury re­
duced the maximum penalty Bowes faced for that offense from ten years in state prison 
to one year in the house of correction. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 265 § 37 (2008) 
(“Any person convicted of violating this provision shall be . . . imprisoned not more 
than one year . . . ; and if bodily injury results, shall be punished by . . . imprisonment 
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330 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
Vassell’s counsel argued in the motion to dismiss that the his­
tory of racially motivated violence and general misfeasance exhib­
ited by Bowes and Bosse should have played a role in the DA’s 
decision-making.179  The same day that the UMPD officer joked 
with Bosse about his Tom Brady jersey, a Milton, Massachusetts 
police officer forwarded several reports documenting Bowes’s and 
Bosse’s involvement in similar incidents to the UMPD.180  From 
these reports, the DA learned that Bowes and Bosse had a long 
history of engaging in disorderly and hateful conduct.181  Their past 
conduct, however, seemed to play no role whatsoever in the DA’s 
decision-making.  One would assume that a DA who aggressively 
prosecutes a student for defending himself against a racially moti­
vated attack would also aggressively prosecute two violent youths 
for not more than ten years . . . .”). This reduction was required to permit the prosecu­
tion to proceed in District rather than Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Zawat­
sky, 670 N.E.2d 969, 972-74 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (concluding that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear a case involving an allegation of a civil rights violation result­
ing in bodily injury).  Interestingly, the DA did not move to amend Count Three, which 
charged Bowes with inflicting a bodily injury in the midst of violating Section 39 of 
Chapter 265 of the Massachusetts General Laws.  Under this statute: 
Whoever commits an assault or a battery upon a person . . . with the intent to 
intimidate such person because of such person’s race . . . shall be punished . . . 
by imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than two and one-half 
years . . . .  Whoever commits a battery in violation of this section and which 
results in bodily injury shall be punished by . . . imprisonment in the state 
prison for not more than five years . . . . 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 §§ 39(a)-(b) (2008).  Pursuant to another statute, the District 
and Superior Courts have dual jurisdiction over “all felonies punishable by imprison­
ment in the state prison for not more than five years.” MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 218 § 26 
(2008).  Accordingly, it appears clear that when the prosecution amended Count Two to 
remove the allegation of bodily injury it did so for the sole purpose of keeping the case 
against Bowes in District Court. 
This exercise of prosecutorial discretion stood in stark contrast to decision-making 
which occurred in the case against Vassell.  Although the crimes he was charged with 
committing—two counts of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon resulting in 
serious bodily injury—could have been prosecuted in District Court, the DA elected to 
proceed in Superior Court and thereby increased the potential penalty Vassell faced 
from five years in the house of correction to thirty years in state prison. See MASS. 
GEN. LAWS. ch. 265 § 15A(c)(1) (2008) (“Whoever . . . by means of a dangerous 
weapon, commits an assault and battery upon another and by such assault and battery 
causes serious bodily injury . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison 
for not more than 15 years or in the house of correction for not more than 2 1/2 years 
. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
179. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 18. 
180. Id. at 18-21. 
181. See id.; Second Supplemental Motion, supra note 171, at 3-10 (enumerating 
close to ten incidents in which Bowes and Bosse allegedly perpetrated violent and 
sometimes racially-motivated attacks). 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 170 S
ide A
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 170 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE108.txt unknown Seq: 31  1-MAY-12 10:39
R
R
R
R
 
 
 
 
331 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
for trespassing and attacking the student in his dormitory.182  In­
stead, the DA chose to treat the white offenders with kid gloves: 
another instance of white privilege. 
IV. MAKING WHITE PRIVILEGE VISIBLE IN THE COURTROOM 
By focusing on whether defendants of color are treated differ­
ently because of their race, existing selective enforcement law fails 
to identify a principal factor contributing to the differential applica­
tion of criminal laws—white privilege. Professor Wildman de­
scribes how antidiscrimination advocates may “focus only on one 
portion of the power system, the subordinated characteristic, rather 
than seeing the essential links between domination, subordination, 
and the resulting privilege.”183  In a similar manner, selective en­
forcement law has typically focused on a single “portion of the 
power system”184—how defendants are targeted because of their 
protected characteristics.185 
Within the legal field, where the goal is the administration of 
justice, serious shortfalls occur when powerful mechanisms of injus­
tice are kept invisible.186  Until white privilege is made visible, legal 
professionals cannot effectively address systemic racial injustice.187 
Professor Wildman writes: 
182. See Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 
12, 14, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2009) 
[hereinafter Supplemental Motion] (discussing how pursuant to the Prosecution Stan­
dards promulgated by the National District Attorneys’ Association, the DA “was 
obliged ‘to make a charging determination which appropriately reflected the offense 
and the offender . . .’ [and] because Bosse’s criminal conduct both in and outside [Vas­
sell’s dormitory] was so repugnant, the District Attorney’s refusal to seek criminal 
charges against him is indefensible”) (brackets omitted). 
183. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 19. 
184. Id. 
185. In Commonwealth v. Franklin, the defendants argued that they were 
targeted because of being black.  Commonweath v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 232 
(1978).  In Commonwealth v. King, the defendants argued that they were targeted be­
cause of being female.  Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 204 (1977). While the 
function of privilege remains obfuscated, these protected characteristics—race and 
sex—become the explicit focus of the inquiry.  Conversely, an inquiry accounting for 
privilege would pose the following questions: Why did the police fail to arrest the white 
members of the Maverick Street Housing Project for their violent acts? Why did the 
Boston police opt not to arrest male prostitutes and male customers of prostitutes? 
186. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 8 (“[The] failure to acknowledge privilege, to 
make it visible in legal doctrine, creates a serious gap in legal reasoning rendering law 
unable to address issues of systemic unfairness.”). See also Davis, supra note 25, at 52 
(“[S]ociety has an interest in a fair and nondiscriminatory criminal justice system.”). 
187. See, for example, Coker, supra note 19, at 862 on systemic racial injustice in 
the administration of criminal laws (discussing “a system that systemically and dispro­
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332 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
The rule of law can operate in conjunction with justice only 
where its substantive content is codified . . . .  Only when we dis­
cuss what has been invisible can any movement toward justice 
occur.  Examining privilege is a way to make these power systems 
visible.  The rule of law has focused on discriminatory, differen­
tial treatment, not on privilege.  As a result these systems 
remain.188 
Codifying white privilege into the law of selective enforcement is 
necessary, then, to advance the “movement toward justice.”189  As 
long as white privilege remains invisible in the courtroom, there will 
be no incentive for law enforcement to contend with the ways in 
which it results in selective enforcement.  As long as white privilege 
remains invisible, judges will be unequipped to remediate its ef­
fects.  As long as white privilege remains invisible, some members 
of the legal community will continue to imagine that it does not 
exist.190  As long as white privilege remains invisible, it will persist. 
The next segment of this Note proposes a modification to ex­
isting selective enforcement law in Massachusetts and argues that 
the modification is imperative in order to prevent hostile courts 
from too readily dismissing selective enforcement claims.  A second 
segment identifies additional benefits that may result from the ex­
plicit recognition of white privilege.  In conclusion, this Note urges 
the SJC to modify the law of selective enforcement to account for 
white privilege. 
A.	 A Proposed Modification to Massachusetts’s Selective 
Enforcement Law 
Under current Massachusetts law, a defendant wishing to 
demonstrate selective enforcement “bears the initial burden to pre­
sent evidence. . . [1] that a broader class of persons than those pros­
ecuted violated the law. . . [2] that failure to prosecute was either 
consistent or deliberate,. . . and [3] that the decision not to prose­
cute was based on an impermissible classification.”191  Then, “[once 
the defendant has] raised a reasonable inference of selective [en­
portionately burdens communities of color with excesses of law enforcement without 
many of the benefits”). 
188.	 WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 146. 
189.	 Id. 
190. See, e.g., Vargas-Vargas, supra note 27, at 56 (“Whites fail to recognize that a 
legal system that consistently offers and protects white privilege will always seem objec­
tive and rational from their perspective.”). 
191.	 Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834, 843 (Mass. 2009). 
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333 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
forcement] by presenting credible evidence that persons similarly 
situated to himself have been deliberately or consistently not prose­
cuted because of their race,” the burden shifts to the Common­
wealth to “rebut that inference.”192  An implicit acknowledgement 
of privilege is contained in the phrase, “persons similarly situated to 
[the defendant who] have been deliberately or consistently not 
prosecuted because of their race.”193  That is, defendants of color 
are able to demonstrate selective enforcement when they present 
evidence that white people who committed comparable offenses are 
not prosecuted because of their race.  This is white privilege pre­
cisely.  It would not be such a great leap conceptually for the law to 
name explicitly that which it already implicitly acknowledges.  Privi­
lege, on the tip of the tripartite test’s tongue, needs only speaking 
aloud. 
To account for white privilege, this Note advocates that the fol­
lowing language be added to the tripartite test: 
Evidence that persons similarly situated to the defendant have 
been deliberately or consistently not prosecuted because of their 
race may include direct or statistical evidence that white offend­
ers were not prosecuted or were prosecuted with less vigor as a 
result of white privilege—the benefits conferred upon them for 
no reason other than their skin color. 
By permitting defendants to introduce evidence of white privilege 
in support of their contention that white offenders similarly situated 
to them have not been prosecuted due to their race, the modifica­
tion takes the focus off of the defendants’ actions and resultant 
charges, and more appropriately onto the white offenders’ actions 
and law enforcement’s failure to bring (appropriate) charges 
against them.  Furthermore, the modification would provide the 
practical benefit of preventing hostile courts from too readily dis­
missing selective enforcement claims. 
A court more hostile to Jason Vassell’s selective prosecution 
claim might have ruled against him in his discovery request. The 
focus in that matter was “whether Jonathan Bosse and John Bowes 
could be considered ‘similarly situated’ to the defendant.”194  Ulti­
mately, the court was willing to “[find] that Bowes’ [sic] and Bosse’s 
192. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008) (internal quota­
tions omitted). 
193. Id. (emphasis added). 
194. Motion for Discovery, supra note 95, at 2.  Defense counsel sought discovery 
from the Commonwealth in furtherance of its selective prosecution claim.  A full discus­
sion of the argument counsel made is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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334 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
conduct was sufficiently similar to that of Vassell’s to conclude that 
Vassell [had] made a threshold showing based on credible evidence 
that he [was] entitled to discovery under Rule 14(a)(2) to investi­
gate his claim of selective prosecution.”195  The court was able to 
come to this conclusion without naming white privilege.  However, 
“courts hostile to selective prosecution claims may find that any 
white comparator is not ‘similarly situated’” due to the improbabil­
ity of the offenses being exactly identical in nature, timing, execu­
tion, etcetera.196 
The DA repeatedly made the argument that Bowes and Bosse 
were not similarly situated to Vassell, because “[he] was the only 
person armed, and thus the only person inflicting knife wounds.”197 
In response, Vassell’s attorneys argued that Vassell and his attack­
ers did not need to be “identically situated,” only similarly situ­
ated.198  Similarity is an amorphous concept in this context. 
According to Vassell’s attorneys, Bowes and Bosse were similar to 
Vassell in two ways: they participated in the “same incident” and 
they “committed serious felonies.”199  However, they were dissimi­
lar to Vassell in one way that became the focal point for the DA: 
they were not armed.200  If the court had been hostile—unwilling to 
take seriously Vassell’s claim of selective prosecution—it could 
have inflated this difference to permit it to find Bowes and Bosse 
dissimilar to Vassell.201 
If the law of selective enforcement accounted for white privi­
lege, it would have been harder for a hostile court to dismiss a claim 
like Vassell’s, or, at a minimum, to deny the defendant’s discovery 
requests.  Though it was not framed as such, Vassell’s preliminary 
showing actually contained evidence of the sort described in the au­
thor’s proposed modification: direct and statistical evidence that 
white offenders were not prosecuted or were prosecuted with less 
195. Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 9. 
196. Coker, supra note 19, at 847. 
197. Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 10. 
198. Discovery Hearing, supra note 149, at 23. 
199. Id. at 11. 
200. Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 10. 
201. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 847-48 (discussing how an Eleventh Circuit 
case found comparable offenders “not ‘similarly situated’ because [they] engaged in the 
conduct only once or twice each while one defendant was alleged to have done so seven 
times and a second defendant to have done so three times”). But see Commonwealth v. 
Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 234 (Mass. 1978) (noting that “there are common sense dis­
tinctions between using firearms and using rocks and firebombs . . . [but w]hen executed 
with the requisite venom, all are crimes of violence involving the possibility of death or 
serious bodily injury”). 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 172 S
ide A
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 172 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE108.txt unknown Seq: 35  1-MAY-12 10:39
R
R
R
R
R
R
 
335 2012] MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW 
vigor as a result of white privilege. Vassell’s direct evidence con­
sisted largely of Bowes’s and Bosse’s criminal records.202  Although 
the two men had long criminal histories—in contrast to Vassell’s 
unsullied record—one was not prosecuted (Bosse) and the other 
was prosecuted with less vigor (Bowes) than the defendant.203  Hav­
ing the benefit of a clean slate even after having made a habit of 
criminal activity is direct evidence of white privilege. 
Vassell also presented statistical evidence of white privilege. 
He alleged that the UMPD may have had a practice of responding 
to interracial altercations on the UMass Amherst campus by declin­
ing to arrest and/or prosecute the white participants even while ar­
resting and prosecuting participants of color.204  In support of this 
allegation, the defense cited the prosecution of Demian Vennell, a 
black man who came to the aid of another black man whom he 
observed being violently assaulted by a white mob.205  Vennell was 
arrested and charged; none of the white assailants were ever 
charged.206  Essentially, Vassell’s attorneys argued that the Vennell 
case demonstrated a statistical likelihood that the UMPD had en­
gaged in or had a practice of engaging in selective enforcement. 
Acknowledging that they “[did not] know what kind of statistics are 
available to show how many interracial assaults are dealt with by 
the [UMPD and DA],”207 defense counsel argued that the evidence 
they had presented was sufficient to make a threshold showing in 
support of additional discovery.208 
202. See supra notes 171 and 181. 
203. See Second Supplemental Motion, supra note 171, at 14 (discussing how the 
National District Attorney Association’s Prosecution Standards provide that in consid­
ering whether to prosecute an offender, the prosecutor should consider “[w]hether the 
defendant is a first-time offender”). 
204. Supplemental Motion, supra note 182, at 2. 
205. Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 7-8. 
206. Id. at 8. 
207. Discovery Hearing, supra note 149, at 9. 
208. As noted previously, the Superior Court agreed that this preliminary show­
ing was sufficient and ordered that the Commonwealth produce: 
1) all police reports, witness statements, and Grand Jury minutes in the case of 
Commonwealth v. Demian Vennell . . . 
2) any and all documentation showing the number of cases charged in Hamp­
shire County in the past five years of assault and battery, assault and battery 
with a dangerous weapon, and aggravated assault and battery with a danger­
ous weapon, where the accused(s) and named victim(s) were of different racial 
backgrounds; and 
3) any and all documentation concerning the number of cases reported to the 
Northwest District Attorney in the last five years of civil rights violations or 
hate crimes, including cases where no formal charges resulted. 
Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 1. 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 172 S
ide B
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 172 Side B      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE108.txt unknown Seq: 36  1-MAY-12 10:39
R
R
 
336 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:301 
Vassell’s evidence of white privilege would have been sufficient 
to raise a “reasonable inference”209 of selective enforcement under 
the proposed modification, and had he made his discovery motion 
and motion to dismiss in a court hostile to selective enforcement 
claims, his claim could not be so easily dismissed.  Under the cur­
rent law, the DA urged the court to consider whether the white 
offenders were different from the black defendant in any way at 
all.210  A hostile court could be easily persuaded by the DA’s argu­
ment and could find that Bowes and Bosse were sufficiently dissimi­
lar from Vassell so as to defeat his claim. The modification 
proposed by this Note, however, would make it harder for such a 
court to readily dismiss a selective enforcement claim on the 
grounds that members of “a broader class of persons . . . [who] vio­
lated the law” are not similarly situated to the defendant.211 
B. Additional Benefits Resulting from the Proposed Modification 
This Note has discussed how a failure to acknowledge white 
privilege in the law of selective enforcement has perpetuated a “se­
rious gap in legal reasoning.”212  Closing this gap is necessary to 
permit the law of selective enforcement to address racial injustice 
effectively.  However, closing this gap could also lead to benefits 
outside the law of selective enforcement; it could propel the con­
cept of privilege into new territory—into other areas of law and 
into white people’s consciousnesses.213 
An explicit acknowledgement of white privilege in the selective 
enforcement context may result in the courts recognizing other 
forms of privilege214 and the function of privilege in other areas of 
law.  In the area of employment discrimination, for example, when 
plaintiffs are required to demonstrate discriminatory intent, the law 
fails to account for the fact that “discrimination has a systemic na­
ture . . . includ[ing] the usually unseen hydra head of privilege.”215 
209. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008). 
210. Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 10. 
211. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 698 (quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 
227, 233-34 (Mass. 1978). 
212. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 8. 
213. See supra Part III.A on the invisibleness of white privilege to white people. 
214. Other forms of privilege include classism, heterosexism, male privilege, and 
able-ism. See generally Kristin Kalsem & Verna L. Williams, Social Justice Feminism, 
18 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 131, 157 (2010) (“Social justice feminism strives to uncover 
and dismantle [patriarchal social and political structures] . . . such as white privilege, 
heterosexism, able-ism, and classism.”). 
215. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 33. 
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Recognizing privilege in this area of law would result in a more 
complete “picture of the dynamic of subordination,” and would 
support a legal system better suited to remedy discriminatory con­
duct in the workplace.216  Recognizing privilege in any area of the 
law may force reluctant judges to contend with it rather than resort­
ing to a belittling or (willfully) blind posture.217 
Furthermore, the formal incorporation of white privilege into 
the law of selective enforcement could have a powerful effect on 
our society even outside of the courtroom.218  When the Supreme 
Court ruled in 1954 that race-based segregation of public school 
children violated the Fourteenth Amendment, it based its opinion 
almost entirely on an argument originating in social theory.219  The 
Court reasoned that segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority 
[amongst black school children] as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”220  Rejecting Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” 
doctrine, the Court noted that a plethora of psychological studies 
and writings had amply documented the “detrimental effect” that 
segregation had upon black children.221  By basing its decision on 
216. Id.  Wildman describes the error in the Supreme Court’s analysis in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), in the following way: 
[I]t examines only discrimination and ignores privilege.  A system of male 
privilege means that men are setting the standard to which women must con­
form . . . .  An analysis of privilege . . . is necessary to examine the gender 
power system and how decisions based on it in the workplace harm women. 
WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 39. 
217. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 781-82 (2007) (Thomas, J. concurring). 
218. See generally Armstrong & Wildman, supra note 123 at 672 (discussing how 
deepening our understanding of race, power, and privilege is necessary “to move this 
diverse nation closer to the democratic ideal of ‘liberty and justice for all’”); Darmer, 
supra note 27, at 132 (emphasizing that achieving social justice requires us to “expos[e] 
racial disparities, not cover[ ]them up”). 
219. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
220. Id. at 494. 
221. Id. at 494-95; see also Michael W. Combs & Gwendolyn M. Combs, Revisit­
ing Brown v. Board of Education: A Cultural, Historical-Legal, and Political Perspec­
tive, 47 HOW. L.J. 627, 631 (2004) (discussing how “separate but equal . . . reflected and 
symbolized the historical cultural tradition . . . [in which w]hites were elevated, while 
African Americans were subordinated”).  But see André Douglas Pond Cummings, A 
Furious Kinship: Critical Race Theory and the Hip-Hop Nation, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. 
REV. 499, 526-27 (2010) for a discussion on Professor Derrick’s Bell’s belief “that the 
Brown decision was made not to provide equal opportunity to blacks, but rather to 
improve the image of the United States in the 1950s as the ‘bellwether’ nation of equal­
ity to Third World nations, in particular to those that supported communism.” 
The impact of Brown v. Board of Education on equality and access to education is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  For discussions on this topic see Maurice R. Dyson, De 
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social and psychological findings, the Court lent a great deal of 
credibility to the concept of internalized inferiority as stemming 
from subordination.  Similarly, were the courts to rely upon findings 
developed under the rubric of white privilege social theory in selec­
tive enforcement claims, the concept of white privilege may gain 
the additional traction and acceptance necessary to cause white 
members of our society to begin to “[i]dentify[ ] and confront[ ] 
whiteness. . . moving the nation forward toward a more complete 
realization of racial equality.”222 
CONCLUSION 
When something inimical remains invisible to a large group of 
people, there is very little incentive for members of this group to 
take any actions to address the harm.223  White privilege is largely 
invisible to white people and the courts have never formally ac­
knowledged it in any serious manner.224  However, as cases like 
Facto Segregation & Group Blindness: Proposals for Narrow Tailoring Under a New 
Viable State Interest in PICS v. Seattle School District, 77 UMKC L. REV. 697 (2009); 
Preston C. Green, III et al., Achieving Racial Equal Educational Opportunity Through 
School Finance Litigation, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283 (2008); Peter Halewood, Sympo­
sium, Laying Down the Law: Post-Racialism and the De-Racination Project, 72 ALB. L. 
REV. 1047 (2009); Amy Stuart Wells et al., Symposium, The Space Between School De­
segregation Court Orders and Outcomes: The Struggle to Challenge White Privilege, 90 
VA. L. REV. 1721 (2004). See also Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial´
Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1023 
(2010) (addressing the “compelling thesis that racialized mass incarceration stems from 
backlash to the civil rights movement”). 
222. Armstrong & Wildman, supra note 123, at 639. 
223. For example, “greenhouse gases are invisible so that humans cannot tell 
where they come from and how dense they are by sight.”  Tsung-Sheng Liao, Surviving 
by “Eating Coins” or Breathing with No Carbon Dioxide: The Dynamic Balance Model 
to Resolve the Potential Conflicts Between the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol, 16 CUR­
RENTS: INT’L  TRADE L.J. 28, 42 (2007).  As a result, the serious problem of global 
warming is not observed or taken seriously by many people. See generally Jules Lobel 
& George Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in 
Foreign Policy and International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045 (2005) (discussing 
how the public may react powerfully to visible environmental crises, such as smog, but 
ignores invisible environmental threats, such as global warming).  In order for the gen­
eral public to care about global warming, it must be made visible. See Marc R. Poirier, 
A Very Clear Blue Line: Behavioral Economics, Public Choice, Public Art and Sea 
Level Rise, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 83, 92, 98 (2007) (describing “[the public’s 
failure] to behave rationally with regard to information about the risk” of rising sea 
level, and the resultant blue line projects, which “plac[e] beacons in parks, linked by [a] 
chalk line,” depicting the encroaching sea level in a visible and meaningful way). 
224. See supra Part III.A and Part III.B. 
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Commonwealth v. Vassell illustrate, white privilege plays a very real 
role in the administration of criminal laws.225 
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Massachusetts Declara­
tion of Rights prohibit law enforcement from applying the law un­
equally.226  Yet, the courts cannot effectively address instances of 
racial injustice in the enforcement of criminal laws until they con­
tend with white privilege, a factor contributing to many instances of 
selective enforcement.  Furthermore, great benefits would likely re­
sult in other areas of the law and in society at large if white privi­
lege were acknowledged and made explicit in this context. For 
these reasons, this Note advocates that the SJC account for white 
privilege in the law of selective enforcement.  One-hundred and 
twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court applauded the state of 
Massachusetts’s contribution to the law of equal protection.227 
Massachusetts should, once again, forge ahead in furtherance of 
equality. 
Mara Shulman Ryan* 
225. See supra Part II.C.2. 
226. See Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 692 (Mass. 2008). 
227. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[I]n the famous language 
of the Massachusetts bill of rights, the government of the commonwealth ‘may be a 
government of laws and not men.’”). 
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2012. I dedicate this 
Note to Luke, whose tremendous insight, intellect, and heart continually amaze me. 
